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Democracy without Minority Groups and Non-nationalists 
Following widespread democratization processes in Eastern and Central Europe, in 
November 1990 the first multi-party elections were held in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (hereinafter, Bosnia or BiH). These elections were among the first 
indicators that marked the democratic transition of the country from the communist 
regime to liberal democracy. However, political parties in the country were allowed 
to be organized along ethnic lines resulting in the nationalist parties together 
collecting 84% of the vote (Arnautović, 2007: 7). Thus, an organization of the first 
democratic elections in the country marked the start of the political hegemony of 
nationalist political parties as the majority of the electorate voted for nationalist 
parties; that is, Bosniaks voted for Party of Democratic  Action (SDA), Bosnian 
Serbs for Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and Bosnian Croats for the Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ) (Freedom House, 2010: 122). To illustrate, even the 
post-election distribution of power was based upon ethnic principles so that the 
President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a Bosniak, president of 
the Parliament was a Serb, and the prime minister was a Croat representative. 
Furthermore, the war that broke out in 1992 further increased ethnic hatred and 
intolerance, resulting in ethnicity and ethnic solidarity as a dominant social and 
political cleavage.  
That is, the conflict between the three ethnic groups intensified inter-ethnic 
polarization and massively strengthened the political domination of ethno-
nationalist political parties in the decision-making processes. What's more, the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, signed in 1995, not only created an extremely 
cumbersome policy process that would frequently result in deadlock, it also left 
unresolved the conflicts that had come to the fore in the 1992-1995 war and 
enshrined the ethno-nationalist principle as the foundation of public discourse 
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(Vogel, 2006: 2). While the DPA brought the war to an end and laid the foundation 
for consolidating peace, many observers also believe that the agreement as a 
document reflects wartime circumstances cannot by itself ensure BiH‘s future as a 
functioning and democratic state (Ashdown, 2005). Thus, the post-war political and 
social space has been largely dominated by three ethnic groups, leading to 
institutional marginalization of minority groups and their members. In the post-
Dayton Bosnia the majority of citizens are in a position of ―homo duplex,‖ or a 
divided human, since they are in a struggle between being a genuine human being 
and loyal ethnic being. While the transition to democracy should bring about 
participation and inclusion of diverse groups into public policy-making, the post-
war Bosnian public sphere has been dominated by an ethno-political matrix 
causing discrimination against minority groups.  
What is more, such an discriminatory political system is in clear conflict with the 
country's efforts to enter the European Union in the foreseeable future. In fact, in 
the end of 1990s through the newly initiated Stabilization and Association Process 
(SAP), the European Union aimed to encourage the path of the region's states, 
including BiH, in integration into political and economic structures of the Bloc 
(Becker, 2008: 20). Additionally, in June 2000 in the Feira European Council it was 
decided that all the SAP countries, including Bosnia, are potential candidates for 
EU membership. Following a difficult reform process Bosnia and Herzegovina 
signed the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) with the EU in June 
2008 which was the first pre-accession tool for this Balkan country towards its 
eventual EU membership. Thus, for BiH and for the whole Western Balkans, the 
EU-related reform process means adjustment to advanced western models as well 
as security and prosperity for the future (Anastasakis, 2005: 80). In other words, the 
so-called Europeanization process has influenced the political, economic, 
administrative and social policy-making in the country.  
Thus, Kubicek (2005, 374) claims that the process of Europeanization not only 
guarantees new opportunities for societal forces that had been previously excluded 
from the policy-making, but it also contributes to transformation of other structural 
elements such as a political ideology (identity politics), the legal framework, and 
the party system, and triggers changes in them all, finally resulting in internal 
reforms. Furthermore, Ladrech (1994) mentions the transformative power of the 
Europeanization process influencing citizenship and national identity. However, it 
is highly debatable to what extent the Europeanization process in Bosnia has 
influenced the idea of citizenship since minority groups and non-national members 
are widely marginalized both on state and society levels. Although there have been 
a number of difficult problems slowing down Bosnia's EU reform process, 
widespread ethnic polarization and omnipresent ethnic domination over the public 
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sphere have become the most staggering challenges on the country's route to 
Brussels. That is, the current Bosnian ethno-political arrangement has limited 
realization of citizens' individual identity that should be an essential part of the 
Europeanization process. The post-war Bosnia has mostly been closer to the 
process of ‗Balkanization‘ that is viewed as contrary to what may be ‗western‘ 
values and norms (Todorova, 1994). 
 
Jurgen Habermas's Theory of Citizen Recognition 
What‘s more, one of the main objectives of establishing the European Community 
(later European Union) was to reduce disintegrative and harmful influences of 
nationalists and thus integrate the European countries into a peaceful, prosperous, 
and secure community. That is, a peaceful and harmonious coexistence between 
different national, linguistic, religious, sexual, and racial groups has been 
encouraged in the EU institutional framework (Zofia Wilk-Woœ, 2010: 79). 
Especially at the beginning of the 1990s the EU intensified its activities in the field 
of minority protection prior to the enlargement of the Central and Eastern European 
countries. Thus, in June 1993 the European Council held in Copenhagen agreed on 
the so-called Copenhagen Criteria that, among other things, emphasizes the 
protection of minority groups. That is, the EU‘s Copenhagen political criteria 
require candidate countries to achieve ―stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities‖ (Harryvan & van der Harst, 1997: 285). This being said, the applicant 
countries are supposed to implement necessary reforms and pass the laws that will 
effectively protect minority groups. 
Thus, the Copenhagen Criteria has considerably contributed to extension of 
individual rights because it cemented the agreement that ―persons belonging to 
national minorities can exercise and enjoy their rights individually as well as in 
community with other members of their group‖ (OSCE, 1990). Additionally, 
Article 12 of the TEC had prohibited discrimination based on national identity. 
Following the Amsterdam Treaty, Article 13 of the TEC forbids discriminatory acts 
on the basis of the eight following grounds: sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Most importantly, in the Treaty of 
Lisbon the minority groups were legally recognized in the text of EU primary law 
(FRA, 2010, 46). Thus, in Article 1a it was stated that the rights of persons 
belonging to minority groups have become the central values and principles that the 
EU protects. Furthermore, the EU Fundamental Rights Charter paves the way for 
the principle of the non-discrimination and encourages the member states to protect 
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religious, cultural and linguistic diversity (Vouters, 2001). This brought the EU 
much closer to its visionary ideal of ―Unity in diversity.‖   
On the other side, contemporary Bosnian public life has been marked by extensive 
exclusive political modus vivendi based one extreme violation of fundamental 
human rights marginalizing both the citizens that do not sympathize with 
nationalist politics and the members of minority groups. Thus, the post-Dayton 
political model has been concerned with the extent and nature of political 
participation of the citizens belonging to the three largest nations in the country. In 
order to thoroughly comprehend and analyze the process of political participation 
of the citizens in the country, Jurgen Habermas's notion of citizen recognition 
provides adequate theoretical framework as a basis for constructive debate. For 
instance, Habermas examines cases where cultural or national identity of citizens 
prevents their political participation in the public sphere with the rest of society, 
denying them the basic human rights. According to Habermas, in the public spaces 
characterized by serious violation of basic human rights by other citizens there 
exists ―an incomplete or unequal inclusion of citizens, to whom full status as 
members of the political community is denied‖ (2005: 16). Simply put, Habermas 
supports the thought that democracy is only possible with widespread presence of 
inclusive participation in a society. 
That‘s why Habermas has strongly defended democratic principles such as popular 
sovereignty, rule of law, constitutionally guaranteed rights, and civil liberties as an 
indispensable component of the open and democratic regime. Therefore, Habermas 
argues that constitutions are the basis for creating peaceful and democratic society 
in heterogeneous contexts. In this regard, he also points out that it is the 
constitutional principles based on a rule of law that unite and integrate the citizens 
of a society in which there is a wealth of social, cultural, national, philosophical 
values and ideas (2003). That is, an inclusive constitution is the basis of 
democratic order in every free and open society. As O'Neill points out: ―no citizen, 
or group of citizens, should be excluded from a democratic process of legitimation. 
Relevant interests and needs, values and aspirations, convictions and conceptions 
of identity, must somehow all be factored into our law-making procedures‖ (2000: 
1). Therefore, societies perceiving themselves as democratic can not set up 
political order on exclusionary or discriminatory constitutional principles or 
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Hegemony of Ethno-nationalist Elites  
More than 15 years since the Dayton Agreement was signed, political tensions are 
still omnipresent across Bosnian society, and national leaders are challenging the 
Peace Accord more openly and more harshly than ever before. That is, in the post-
Dayton Bosnia the exclusive ethno-nationalist approach to politics has managed to 
gain the upper hand over reconciliation and consensus (Bianchini, 2000: 79). Thus, 
BiH is still far from the functioning and democratic state that the accord had 
envisioned. Today the country still consists of three de facto mono-ethnic 
territories, three education systems and a national government where ethnic key is 
the rule of the game. In fact, the whole state structure is built according to an 
omnipresent ethno-nationalist model. Therefore, the three majority ethnic groups 
dominate the public discourse in every aspect of life excluding minorities and non-
nationalists. The best example is the Bosnian rotating presidency consisting of 
three members: one Bosniak, one Croat and one Serb, each of whom must be 
directly elected in their respective entity. That is, the Bosnian constitution is 
treating non-ethnic members of its community as aliens or apostates. What is more, 
under such a political regime it is shameful and sometimes even dangerous to 
declare yourself as non-nationalist or minority member.  
In fact, as stated in the Dayton Agreement, the Constitution of BiH prevents 
candidacy of ―others,‖ which are minority groups, to the Presidency and the House 
of Peoples on the grounds of their ethnic origins because these positions are 
guaranteed for the so-called ‗constituent‘ peoples, i.e. Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. 
Thus, ethnic groups are represented as communities in different power-sharing 
levels institutionalizing the ethnic nationalism as a dominant political objective. 
The hegemony of ethno-politicians has been perpetuated by a vague and 
manipulative idea of ―constituent peoples.‖ As a result, minority groups and non-
ethnic members of Bosnian society are completely excluded from the current 
power-sharing model. It is a kind of heresy to claim yourself non-ethnic or a 
sympathizing minority identity. As Touquet and Vermeersch argue: 
 ―These people have now been excluded from mainstream accounts of the 
outcomes of the recent conflict: it is not possible to be a Yugoslav, a Bosnian 
or an Eskimo in a situation in which ethnic nationalism has transcended all 
else and in which there are intensely localized variations in identity and 
‗national‘ sentiments‖ (2008: 280). 
To put it differently, a number of scholars regularly point out that DPA was 
negotiated by the nationalist actors, who actually were one of the main causes of 
the war, and thus it just extended the power of the ethic-nationalist parties and their 
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leaders (Kaldor, 1997: 28-30). Bosnian citizens who do not belong to the so-called 
―constituent peoples‖ were forgotten during the negotiations in Dayton and later 
completely excluded from the institutional framework. Thus, the so-called ―others‖ 
in the Bosnian constitution, namely Jews, Roma and all other national minorities, 
together with those who do not declare affiliation with the three ethnic groups, 
have become citizens without institutional space to exercise their political and 
social rights. Given such unlawful provisions of the Bosnian constitution, the 
country has faced a deep institutional and constitutional crisis which openly 
threatened the idea of democratic participation. As the post-war Bosnia was 
designated to become an ―ethnic state‖ in the eyes of ethno-nationalist leaders, the 
national minorities as an argument of genuine multi-national Bosnia have been 
marginalized from public space. 
Thus, through extensive institutionalization of ethno-nationalization, Bosnia has 
become a place where only citizens declaring themselves to be nationalist have a 
right to take part in the country's policy-making processes. In fact, the category of 
―others‖ and non-nationalists are openly perceived as a threat to the power-sharing 
model of rotation where three ethnic groups choose their representatives 
respectively. The ―rotation model‖ is a clear mechanism of political engineering in 
order to achieve the objective of ethnically-divided Bosnia. Thus, democratic 
participation in the country is competition between ethnicities or ethnic 
communities rather than a race of equal personalities having the right of vote. As a 
result, the post-war hegemony of ethno-nationalists has paradoxically resulted in 
increasing democratic deficit of the country. Consequently, all those that belong to 
the category of ―others‖ who number 17 in BiH-- namely Albanians, Montenegrins, 
Czechs, Italians, Jews, Hungarians, Macedonians, Germans, Polls, the Roma, 
Romanians, Russians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Slovenians, Turks and Ukrainians 
(Hammarberg, 2010: 6)-- are playing a role of mere spectators during democratic 
elections. In this way, the ―others‖ and non-nationalists among the Bosnian 
population have become ―strangers in their own country.‖ 
 
Exclusion of the Minority Members from the Policy-Making Process 
The Dayton Agreement resulted in a power-sharing structure dividing Bosnia into 
two ―ethnic‖ entities, the Bosnian Serb-populated Republika Srpska, and Bosniak- 
and Croat-populated Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, at the state level 
there is a rotating presidency consisting of three ethnic representatives respectively 
and a state parliament, both of which are superior to the entity institutional 
structures. Nevertheless, as stated in the Dayton Agreement, the Constitution of 
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BiH prevents candidacy of ―others,‖ which are minority groups, to the Presidency 
and the House of Peoples on the ground of their ethnic origins because these 
positions are guaranteed for the so-called ‗constituent‘ peoples, i.e. Bosniaks, 
Serbs, and Croats. This includes national minorities who have lived in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina for centuries (Claridge, 2010: 1). This power-sharing arrangement has 
considerably contributed to the process of ethno-nationalization since non-ethnic 
elements are completely excluded from the political participation in the country 
where they were born. That is, the citizens from minority groups such as the Roma, 
Turks, or Jews are granted only a limited degree of self administration (Soberg, 
2008: 715). Although BiH joined the Council of Europe on 24 April 2002, there has 
been increasing discrimination against minorities in the country.  
By forbidding minority members to run for office the Bosnian constitution violates 
fundamental human rights, though in 2002 its government ratified the ECHR and 
its Protocols. Thus, Jakob Finci and Dervo Sejdić, who are respectively Jewish and 
Roma by their ethnicity, contested these provisions before the ECHR since they 
were banned from running for office. On December 2009 the Court ruled that the 
exclusion of minority groups from Bosnia‘s highest elected offices constituted 
unjustified discrimination. Thus, ―the European Court has made it clear that race-
based exclusion from political office has no place in Europe," said Clive Baldwin, 
senior legal advisor at HRW (Guardian, 2009). If correctly implemented, the 
decision of the ECHR will assist in breaking down ethnic and religious divisions in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina by encouraging political participation and representation, 
and promoting social cohesion (Claridge, 2010: 2). However, two years have 
passed from the Court decision and the country's politicians have not yet removed 
discriminatory provisions from the constitution due to their different ethnic 
interests. As a result, Bosnia is still a profoundly undemocratic country. While 
most of Europe is going towards multi-national structures Bosnia is still pushing 
ethno-nationalization.  
For instance, the Roma problem in the country is the most illustrative case. 
Although in 2008 Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the Action Plan to Address the 
Problems of Roma in Employment, Housing and Healthcare, this minority group is 
still highly marginalized. Similarly, both in the pre-war and the post-war Bosnia 
the Roma have been one of the most marginalized and repressed minority groups. 
According to the Roma NGOs, 75,000-100,000 Roma are living in BiH and they 
are considered to be one of the largest national minorities in the country. Although 
the country is on the way to the European Union there has been has been profound 
discrimination against Roma from education, employment, and health to political 
representation. For instance, Roma are the most numerous ethnic group amongst 
the homeless in BiH. More than 70% of Roma do not have a house, while the rate 
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of Roma returnees is very low (2009). According to a 2007 report by UNICEF, up 
to 80% of Roma children in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not attend school; only 
20% of Roma participate in secondary education, and less than 1% in higher 
education (2007). The proportion of Roma employed within the public sector in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is estimated at 2–3%.Thus, they are discriminated against 
even in terms of basic human rights. 
In addition, even in the media the Roma members are degraded and described as 
―problematic,‖ ―violent,‖ ―dangerous,‖ etc. For instance, when an incident 
involving the Roma happens, their full names are given in sensational headlines, 
even if they are minors, with almost an obligatory remark that they belong to the 
Roma minority (Turcilo, 2009). In addition, the Council of Europe Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Mr. Thomas Hammarberg, and his delegation visited Bosnia 
and Herzegovina from 27 to 30 November 2010 in order to evaluate the living 
conditions of minority groups in BiH. As far as the Roma minority is concerned, 
the Delegation summarized that their lifestyle prevented the state from including 
them in statistics. The government knows they live in difficult situations and is 
serious about this issue. But the delegation said the question was more one of 
prejudice than discrimination (2011). Further, the Delegation recommended to the 
Bosnian government to intensify efforts in order to improve the social and 
economic conditions of the Roma community drawing upon the Council of Europe 
Committee of Ministers‘ Recommendation on the Policies for Roma and/or 
Travelers in Europe (CM, 2008).  
 
Institutionalization of Ethno-nationalist Paradigm  
In addition, in Bosnia the education system has been widely utilized by the ruling 
ethno-nationalists to strengthen their ethnic hegemony. In fact, ethnic leaders have 
not demonstrated necessary political will and commitment to establish genuine 
multi-ethnic schools. What is more, education policies have played significant role 
in the promotion of ethnic segregation. As the European Commission pointed out 
in its 2009 Progress Report for BiH: ―Divisions in the education system through 
continuous development of mono-ethnic schools in both entities are still a matter 
of concern and result in de facto segregation of pupils from the very beginning of 
their schooling‖ (2009). For instance, the educational system in the Federation of 
BiH is built on the model of ―two schools under one roof‖ where children from 
two ethnic groups, Croats and Bosniaks, attend classes in the same building, but 
are physically separated from each other and taught separate curriculum. Today, 
there are 57 such schools in this part of Bosnia. Some ethnic politicians oppose 
Institutional Discrimination against the Minority Groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina… 63 
 
integrated multi-ethnic schools free from political, religious and any other 
discrimination, arguing they would lose their ethnic identity by mixing with others. 
Ethno-nationalists have used education for the systematic indoctrination of their 
respective ethnic groups.  
What is more, the education system in BiH, instead of playing the role of an 
integrative platform in which democratic values and norms are being taught, has 
been under the vehement influence of ethno-nationalist political elites resulting in 
serious discrimination of minority groups. Put simply, the children of minority 
groups in Bosnia have been the collateral damage of the ethno-nationalist policy-
making in the sphere of education. On the other hand, the OECD stresses in its 
report published in September 2001 that ―education systems should not just be 
‗fair‘ to minorities – they should promote a spirit of equality and tolerance among 
ethnic and cultural groups‖ (2001). However, in the post-Dayton Bosnia minorities 
have become ―invisible‖ in the education system which is hammering out ethno-
nationalist paradigm. As Valery Perry argues:  
 ―Let us take a look at language. The official language in the Republika 
Srpska is Serbian, and in the Federation the official languages are Bosnian or 
Croatian, depending on the canton. The ‗others‘ learn the language that is 
dominant in their particular surrounding. It is worth stressing that we have 
three official languages in one country. ‗Others‘ have been assimilated into 
an official language, but only the language of their specific territory, which 
in my opinion is not in accordance with their human rights.‖ (2002: 27)   
Probably the marginalization of minority groups from the Dayton negotiations and 
from the agreed accord conception was a result of a speedy reaction to end the war 
and find a difficult compromise solution. The most important thing was to end the 
horrible war and find a power-sharing model in which each ethnic group would 
take part without being discriminated and dominated by other two groups 
respectively. That is, the main objective of the Dayton negotiations was peace 
rather than equality, thus discriminating against non-nationalist groups. As the 
European Court of Human Rights concluded in their ruling concerning the Sejdic-
Finci case:  
 ―a very fragile cease-fire was in effect on the ground. The provisions were 
designed to end a brutal conflict marked by genocide and ‗ethnic cleansing‘. 
The nature of the conflict was such that the approval of the ‗constituent 
peoples‘ … was necessary to ensure peace. This could explain, without 
necessarily justifying, the absence of representatives of other communities 
… at the peace negotiations and the participants‘ preoccupation with 
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effective equality between the ‗constituent peoples‘ in the post-conflict 
society‖ (2009: 34). 
As a result, BiH has become a bi-cameral legislature where the three so-called 
―constituent peoples,‖ Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, are represented in parity (5:5:5) 
in the second chamber, the House of Peoples (Marko, 2005: 6). In addition, both 
state presidency and national government with ministers and their deputies are 
composed according to the ethnic power-sharing. Thus, the post-Dayton 
institutional framework is to a large extent based on the consociationalist model of 
power-sharing (Lipjhart, 1994). Consociationalism is a form of power-sharing 
whose main purpose is reconciliation of diverse social preferences along ethnic and 
religious lines (Schneckener 2002: 203-206). In other words, the Dayton 
Agreement has resulted in an institutional framework in which the largest three 
ethnic groups are officially recognized in the constitution and which take equal part 
at all administrative decision-making levels, also enjoying the same right of veto 
when their respective ―vital national rights‖ are endangered (Bieber, 2004). 
However, the consociationalist model of power-sharing in Bosnia has not brought 
about necessary democratic transformation and reconciliation even after the period 
of 15 years of transition. What is more, while envisaged to keep the equilibrium 
between three ethnic groups the Dayton-based consociationalist model completely 
excluded minority members and non-nationalists from the decision-making 
process.  
 
Institutional Engineering Killing the Idea of Citizenship  
Thus, the post-war power-sharing order in Bosnia has heavily relied on the 
constituent ethnic groups. However, weak performance of democracy and ethnic 
tolerance under the current rules reveals limits of institutional engineering 
(Manning & Antić 2003, 55-56). It is of crucial importance to apply institutional 
engineering in post-conflict societies in order to bring peace and stability among 
warring fractions. In fact, institutional engineering is the art of providing for rules 
and institutions in order to pursue political goals – such as creating a functioning 
multi-ethnic democracy (Reilly 2001; Grofman & Stockwell 2003). Nevertheless, 
the war in Bosnia was thought to end through ethnic balance of power-sharing 
which resulted in a political concept that was counterproductive, further increasing 
ethnic tensions among warring groups. As Prof. Zarije Seizovic points out: ―The 
―ethnic criteria‖ introduced in the Preamble of the Constitution of BiH (being 
reinforced in number of places in its normative part) prevents BiH authorities from 
sharing power equally within the civil society, favouring ethnic groups to the 
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detriment of the individual citizen‖ (2007: 2). In fact, such a power-sharing model 
has been viewed in essentialist and absolutist terms by ethnic groups as a clear 
example of the zero-sum game.  
In fact, while minority groups were completely marginalized during the 
negotiations among warring ethnic groups, their presence and political inclusion 
could be utilized for the development of a democratic and open system of 
governance. While today after the ruling of the ECHR they have become a huge 
problem for the country's integration into Euro-Atlantic associations they could 
actually be a part of a long-term solution. In fact, the Constitution of BiH 
recognizes basic human rights and protection of minority groups and requires the 
State institutions and both Entity governments to ensure the highest level of 
internationally recognized human rights and freedom from discrimination (Art. II 
4). Yet in practice, all the country's citizens do not enjoy human rights and 
fundamental freedoms on an equal basis. That is, the current constitutional order 
was unsuccessful from the very outset in BiH, as it has not provided for protection 
of individual citizens but their collective identity (Seizovic, 2007: 2). Were the 
minority protected from the discriminatory acts the whole concept would turn from 
ethnic to civic, eradicating the ethnic homogenization as a main source of political 
and social tensions in Bosnia. This would lead to strengthening of universal human 
rights as prescribed by the liberal-democratic order.      
Following the ethnic conflict in 1992-1995 and the post-war domination of the 
ethno-nationalist paradigm the citizenship in Bosnia has acquired unique features 
based extensively on the primacy of group rights over individual rights. In fact, the 
Dayton constitutional framework guarantee both state and entity citizenship for the 
population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is, acquisition of the entity citizenship 
has further intensified the process of ethnic homogenization and also exclusion of 
non-ethnic elements in the country. As Sarajlic points out:  
 ―In addition to the malaise of postsocialist transition, shared by all the 
Yugoslavian successor states, the existing Bosnian citizenship regime has 
been strongly influenced by a heritage of ethnic conflict and the provisional 
constitutional set-up of the country, ... the conceptualization of citizenship in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has been dependent on the definition of the 
community of citizens who constitute the state. Since Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is not a nation-state (and has never been one) but a federal 
union based on the sovereignty of ethnic groups which have political 
supremacy over individuals, making clear-cut assumptions and definitions of 
Bosnian citizenship is close to impossible (2010: 2).  
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That‘s why it has become almost illogical to talk about the citizens of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina since more than half of the country's population do feel like Serbs, 
Croats, or Bosniaks rather than Bosnians. In other words, BiH political discourse 
has become limited and even restrictive for the members perceiving themselves as 
Yugoslavs, Bosnians, Romas, Jews, and so forth. In that regard, Prof. Atajic points 
out that, ―Everything – from the greeting you use to the dialect you speak and the 
newspaper in your coat pocket – is judged, commented upon and categorized in 
terms of an omnipresent, mysticised ‗ethnicity‘. Under such circumstances, 
defining oneself as a citizen of the BiH state is tantamount to a betrayal of one‘s 
national identity‖ (2002:118). In fact, ethnicity is perceived by the vast majority of 
people in Bosnia as a religious dogma that has to be respected. Such a situation has 
produced negative consequences on the development of common Bosnian 
citizenship. In this context, there is also a kind of absurdity; namely, even those 
citizens who are Bosnians (instead of being Serbs, Bosniaks or Croats) constitute a 
minority in BiH (Turcilo, 2009: 1). In other words, every person not aligning 
himself/herself with one of the three ethnic groups is automatically considered a 
minority or a kind of foreign element. 
 
 “Vital National Interest” as a Rule of the Game 
Furthermore, the interests of collectivity have dominated individual preferences of 
the citizens preventing development of free discussion and inclusion of non-ethnic 
elements of society. As Mujkic and Husley point out: ―Since the first democratic 
elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991, politics have been characterized by 
ethnopolitics rather than interest-based politics. The result is that political 
competition for voters has been warped, with the role of voters reduced to a kind of 
ethnic census‖ (2010: 144). What's more, before the day of elections the vast 
majority of the members of three ethnic groups decide ―collectively‖ to give the 
vote to their ethno-nationalist political parties respectively. Not only are non-
nationalists and members of minority groups excluded from the public discourse, 
but they are very often under strong pressure to give their vote to one of the 
nationalist political parties. In other words, the post-war ethno-nationalization 
discourse has created an omnipresent ―ethno-nationalist pressure‖ over the 
members of Bosnian society to identify with one of the three national groups. That 
is, the post-war ethno-nationalist paradigm ―naturally‖ exerts a pressure on 
Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Catholics, and Bosnian Orthodox to align with their 
respective nationalist political parties.   
In terms of the institutional ethno-nationalization, the Bosnian system suffers from 
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institutional blockades that emerge because politicians elected separately by each 
ethnic community do not manage to agree on compromises that can withstand the 
manifold veto powers (Chivvis & Đogo, 2010). The exclusionary Bosnian 
institutional structure under Dayton has allowed  the representatives of each of the 
three ethnic groups to enjoy veto power over any proposed legislation, and it 
created the tripartite state presidency consisting of each group and empowered each 
member with a veto over any legislation. While ―veto power‖ of the ethnic 
representatives is their guarantee mechanism that they will be equally included in 
the decision-making process, it is clearly discriminating against civic interests. As 
Lyon claims, ―the concept of ―constitutionality of nationalities‖ permits legalized 
discrimination on the basis of ethnic background, and prima facie contradicts 
principles of the Council of Europe. Indeed, the entire constitution enshrines ethnic 
discrimination as a principle of law (2006: 52). In fact, each and every civic 
initiative is discredited by the highly institutionalized ethno-nationalist discourse. 
In addition, extensive institutionalization of ethno-nationalist politics in the post-
Dayton Bosnia has been realized through a structural framework where ethnic 
rights are safeguarded on the basis of the so-called ―vital national interest‖ (VNI). 
That is, in the House of Peoples of BiH the representatives of each constituent 
nation have a right to block law if it is against the VNI of their respective nation. 
In a similar fashion, the tripartite state presidency has the power of veto on 
legislative decisions if they believe they represent a threat for the vital interests of 
their nations. However the notion of the VNI in the Bosnian case employs a rather 
vague sense of ―national.‖ ―National‖ is usually interpreted simply as ―ethnic‖ 
(Mujkic, 2007). Therefore, at the heart of the notion of VNI clearly lies the ethnic 
dimension of political representation rather than a kind of state or national interest. 
That‘s why the principle of VNI is highly discriminatory against minority groups 
and non-nationalists since they do not have a right to use veto in state and entity 
levels. Simply put, widespread politicization of ethnicity and the success of 
ethnically-oriented political parties are serious obstacles in front of the long-term 
democratization process (Chandler, 2000: 111). 
 
The main idea behind the vital national interest was to provide a sophisticated 
system of checks and balances to guarantee the rights of Bosnia and Herzegovina‘s 
―constituent peoples,‖ i.e. Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. State and Entity 
constitutions establish blocking mechanisms protecting the "vital interests" of 
these constituent peoples (EC, 2005: 9). However, as VNI completely marginalizes 
each member of the society not declaring as nationalist, it is further slowing down 
legislative process on the country's road to the Euro-Atlantic integration. This 
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power-sharing provision based on the concept of VNI has impaired the quality of 
Bosnian democracy where citizens are represented only as members of one of the 
three constituent peoples, placing ethnic representation before general interest and 
making ―nations rather than citizens the bearers of all rights‖ (Katana and Igric, 
2005). As stated in the report of the USAID, ―Bosnia‘s constitution enshrines the 
―vital national interests‖ of the constituent peoples and in doing so guarantees both 
political inclusion and exclusion by ethnicity... Bosnians filter public discourse by 
ethnicity, including as valid their group‘s views, excluding as invalid the views of 
other groups. The public square is available to all – one opinion, one voice and one 
group at a time‖ (2007: 6).   
 
With Democratic Deficit towards Brussels!  
Therefore, the post-war Bosnian political system does not contain democratic 
values such as equality and freedom and it does not ensure that all its citizens feel 
equal before the law and have equal access to the legislative process. As Bojkov 
stresses, democracy in post-war Bosnia can not be said to be constitutionally 
framed (2003: 60). Democracy is a form of government in which all citizens can 
participate on an equal basis in the decision-making process that affects their lives. 
The term democracy was invented in ancient Greece in the middle of the 4
th
 
century BC to define the political order in some Greek city-states, and means ―rule 
of people,‖ coined from demos, meaning people, and kratos which means power. 
In terms of ontology of power, in the post-Dayton Bosnia the political power has 
been in the hands of ethnic oligarchies and ethnic communities as a group rather 
than in the hands of individual citizens. That is, Bosnian social context has been 
dominated by the idea of Volksgemeinshaft, or the people's community, rather than 
community of free individuals. In this manner, Prof. Živanović highlights the post-
war political constellations in Bosnia and Herzegovina as following: ―Here, we do 
not live as human beings but as Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks‖ (2005). In fact, the 
post-Dayton regime has dehumanized public space in Bosnia.   
Thus, today‘s Bosnia resembles rather a kind of ―illiberal democracy,‖ as Fareed  
Zakaria explains the phenomenon of promotion of free elections around the world 
without provision of basic human rights and freedoms (1997). Thus, post-war 
Bosnian political regime is a kind of ethnocracy rather than representing a 
democratic system. An ethnocracy is a regime that facilitates ―the expansion, 
ethnicization and control of contested territory and state by a dominant ethnic 
nation‖ (Yiftachel and Ghanem, 2004: 649). In fact, extreme prioritization of 
ethnic values over individual principles has been threatening to democracy. As 
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Mujkic points out:  
 ―I call a community characterized by the political priority of the ethnic 
group(s) over the individual that is implemented through democratic self-
legislation, and a community characterized by the political priority of the 
ethnic group‘s right to self-determination over the citizen‘s right to self-
determination where the citizen‘s membership in a political community is 
determined by her or his membership in ethnic community, Ethnopolis. And 
I call the political narrative and practice intended to justify this ethnically-
based social construct, ethnopolitics‖ (2007: 116). 
In addition, the Dayton-based constitutional framework is in contradiction with 
European Union values of fundamental and human rights. Simply put, the Dayton 
Agreement ensures the protection of collective rights of ethnic groups while rights 
of minority groups have not been included into the legal framework. Thus, in 
March 2005 the Venice Commission proposed the range of the constitutional 
reforms that are necessary to prepare Bosnia and Herzegovina for future EU 
membership. The main recommendations that the Venice Commission made are:  
 Transfer of competencies from the entities to the state, 
 Reform of inefficient state legislative and executive structures, 
 Elimination of ―prerogatives for ethnic or group rights,‖ 
 Strengthening citizens‘ rights, 
 Clarification of the entities‘ future relationship to the state (Joseph and 
Hitchner, 2008: 5).  
The Venice Commission also summarizes that Bosnian integration into the EU is 
under threat since its institutional framework is in direct breach of ECHR stated 
rules highlighting ―the existence of tensions between a constitutional system based 
on collective equality of ethnic groups on one hand, and the principle of individual 
rights and equality of citizens on the other.‖ (2005: 17).  
Also, persons not belonging to the three biggest national groups may align with one 
of the three nationalist political affiliations in order to feel on equal basis with the 
members of the three ethnic groups. For instance, there have been high-positioned 
officials at state government that have preferred one of the ethnic political parties 
in order to ―exercise their citizenship rights.‖ However, this is not a long-term 
solution that can guarantee the equality of citizens in the whole country. In this 
regard, the Venice Commission highlights that:  
 ―First of all, the interests of persons not belonging to the three constituent 
peoples risk being neglected or people are forced to artificially identify with 
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one of the three peoples although they may, for example, be of mixed origin 
or belong to a different category. Each individual is free to change his 
political party affiliation. By contrast, ethnic identity is far more permanent, 
and individuals will not be willing to vote for parties perceived as 
representing the interest of a different ethnic group, even if these parties 
provide better and more efficient government. A system favoring and 




Bosnia and Herzegovina has been in the group of the former communist countries 
that started widespread democratic transformation in the aftermath of turbulent 
disintegration of Yugoslavia in early 1990s. While democratic transition in the 
country was expected to bring about wide participation of diverse societal groups 
into policy-making, the post-war Bosnian public sphere has been dominated by 
ethno-nationalists causing omnipresent discrimination against minority groups and 
those that declare themselves non-nationalists. That is, democracy brought about 
collectivist doctrine rather then promotion of individual rights. In addition, in spite 
of the fact that BiH is going through a deep Europeanization process in which the 
country's political, economic and administrative system are supposed to transform 
into stable, functional and democratic structures, the members of minority groups 
and non-nationalists are widely marginalized and excluded from the decision-
making processes. Although the Copenhagen political criteria require applicant 
countries to achieve ―stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities,‖ BiH is facing 
serious democratic deficit even today, especially with regards to widespread 
discrimination against minority members and people who do not feel as 
nationalists.  
In other words, in the post-Dayton Bosnia the public sphere has become limited 
only for the members of the three largest ethnic groups constitutionally recognized 
as the so-called constituent nations. As Jurgen Habermas argues, the public space 
has been built on extreme marginalization of citizens as the holders of power 
whose status as the members of political community has been restricted. In fact, 
democratic participation in the country's public space has turned into a competition 
between ethnicities or ethnic communities rather than race of equal individuals 
having the right of vote. The question of ethnicity has become a raison d'être of the 
three ethnic groups since they believe that their physical survival depends on the 
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permanent struggle for ethnic identity. Such a political model is a kind of ethno-
democracy or ethnocracy which vehemently violates human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and thus slows down the country's progress towards EU 
membership. BiH can not enter the EU while its public sphere is extremely 
dominated by ethno-nationalist elites that prevent development of open and 
democratic society. Therefore, BiH politicians, media, civil society and other pro-
EU societal actors must make additional efforts in order to include diverse societal 
groups, including minority members and non-nationalists, into the decision-
making process. Inclusion of the minority members into the policy-making process 
can probably turn from being a problem into a part of solution for the country's 
decade-long deadlock! 
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Although over more than 10 years Bosnia and Herzegovina has been going through an 
extensive European Union-related reform process, the country is still facing serious 
democratic deficit. In particular, the post-Dayton public sphere has been dominated by 
ethno-nationalist political elites which are doing everything to exclude non-nationalists and 
members of minority groups from the decision-making process. This is a clear paradox 
since one of the main objectives behind the integration of the European countries into the 
European Community was to reduce disintegrative and dangerous influences of nationalists 
and establish a peaceful, prosperous, and secure community. In this article, we analyze the 
process of the post-Dayton ethno-nationalization resulting in a widespread discrimination 
against the so-called ―others‖ as they are defined in the Constitution. In the post-war BiH, 
democratic participation has turned into a competition between the three ethnic 
communities, Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, rather than race of equal individuals having 
equal right of vote. That‘s why Bosnian people are still living under the political system 
which is closer to ethno-democracy or ethnocracy rather than democratic regime. Under 
such a discriminatory regime BiH can not enter the European Union, which is a model of 




Democracy, Dayton Agreement, European Union, Minority Groups, Citizen, Ethno-natio-
nalism, Group Rights, Individual Rights. 
 
 
